Peer reviewed version Cyswllt i'r cyhoeddiad / Link to publication
Introduction
During the 2000s (and especially since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007), the role of capital in minimizing the impact of unforeseen losses on the part of financial institutions has received widespread attention. In this paper we examine the capitalization of US credit unions.
Credit unions are non-profit, cooperative financial institutions governed by their membership on a one-member-one-vote basis, with eligibility for membership defined by the credit union's common bond. At the end of 2012, credit unions accounted for approximately 10% of all consumer savings and deposits in the US, servicing over 96 million members drawn from a wide cross-section of society.
Unlike other retail financial institutions, credit unions are not permitted to raise capital by issuing new equity. Over time, net worth accumulates through the retention of (tax exempt) earnings that are not distributed to members, in the form of dividends on share accounts, or favourable rates paid on deposit accounts, or subsidized rates charged on loans.
1 This implies capital shortages cannot be rectified quickly, and suggests that the capital adjustment of credit unions may differ from that of commercial banks and non-financial firms.
Before 2000 US credit unions were not subject to any formal capital (net worth)
requirements. In 1997, the US Treasury recommended that the National Credit Union Association (NCUA), the regulator, introduce specific net worth requirements in the form of 1 defined minima for capital-to-assets ratios (US Treasury, 1997) . Under a new Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) regime introduced in 2000, a range of mandatory and supervisory actions (such as restricting dividends paid to members and dismissing the credit union management) were applied to undercapitalized credit unions in order to restore net worth.
Under these regulatory arrangements, US credit unions have, in general, withstood the financial crisis of the late-2000s better than many banks (Smith and Woodbury, 2010) . Utilizing credit union level semi-annual data compiled from Call Reports published by the NCUA for the period June 1994 to December 2012 and state-level macroeconomic data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, we estimate a panel sample-selection model, comprising a probit regression for the probability of survival for each credit union in each six-month period, and a fixed-effects regression for the change in the capital-to-assets ratio. This allows us to examine the capital-adjustment process, and the speed and pattern of recovery from any adverse capitalization shock. We also examine the effects of the PCA regime introduced in 2000 (by classifying credit unions by their capitalization and sub-dividing the observation period into relevant sub-periods), and the effects of credit union-specific and macroeconomic factors on capitalization. We subdivide the post-2000 period into two further sub-periods (2000-08 and 2 2009-12) , in recognition of a sharp deterioration in credit union capitalization that followed the financial crisis.
Key empirical findings are as follows. Until the financial crisis, credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below followed a faster adjustment path following an adverse capitalization shock than their well capitalized counterparts. This pattern was reversed, however, in the aftermath of the crisis. The introduction of the PCA regulatory regime coincided with a sustained reduction in the proportion of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below, which continued until the onset of the crisis. Since the crisis, credit union capitalization has deteriorated, and the speed of recovery of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below following an adverse capitalization shock has been sharply reduced. Increases in credit union lending naturally tend to reduce capitalization, which varies pro-cyclically. In the absence of any option to raise new capital in the form of equity, credit unions tend to manage their capital cautiously over the business cycle. The probability of survival is increasing in size, but decreasing in age. A high capital-to-assets ratio or a high loans-to-assets ratio increases the probability of survival, but a high liquid assets-to-total assets ratio reduces the probability of survival. During the late-2000s , large credit unions experienced a smaller reduction in their capitalization, on average, than small credit unions.
In summary, this study provides new insights into the factors that determine the capital held by credit unions, the relationship between state-level macroeconomic conditions and credit union capitalization, and the impact of a major regulatory change on capital management and capital adjustment. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of capital adequacy regulation of US credit unions. Section 3 reviews the literature on capital adequacy regulation and capital management for both banks and credit unions. Section 4 3 describes the empirical model, while Section 5 describes the data, and reports descriptive statistics. Section 6 reports and interprets the empirical findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Capital adequacy regulation of credit unions
Capital requirements for credit unions are set by statute which requires Congress to revisit capital requirements as economic and financial conditions change (Wilcox, 2011 In 1994 the proportion of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below (post-2000 terminology), with capital-to-assets ratios below 7%, was as high as 8.3%. In anticipation of the new regulatory arrangements, the proportion of credit unions classified as 5 The CUMAA specifies mandatory actions for credit unions that do not meet capital adequacy standards. These include: annual earnings retentions of at least 0.4% of total assets; the submission and adherence to a net worth restoration plan (NWRP); lending restrictions; and the prohibition of increases in assets until net worth is restored. The CUMAA allows the NCUA to use 14 supervisory actions to supplement the mandatory actions.
6 Wilcox (2011) , analysing the recent crisis period, argues that as a result of capital pressures many credit unions have been forced to limit their traditional role as safe harbours for depositors, accommodating less deposit growth than during and after past recessions, and reducing their lending substantially. In addition some credit unions have been forced to ask large depositors to temporarily shift their deposits elsewhere. The influence of firm-specific, industry, legal and institutional factors on the capital structure of non-financial firms in the US and elsewhere is examined by Rajan and Zingales (1995) , MacKay and Phillips (2005) , Flannery and Rangan (2006) , Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) , Cook and Tang (2010) , Hovakimian and Li (2011) , and Oztekin and Flannery (2012 (Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee and Oztekin, 2008) .
A few studies examine the impact of capital regulation for credit unions. 11 Jackson (2007) examines the capitalization of US credit unions during the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] The specification of the capital-adjustment equation allows for different intercepts and different patterns of dependence of k i,t on k i,t-1 and k i,t-m (for m=1,2) for credit unions that were well capitalized (k i,t-1 0.07) and those that were adequately capitalized or below (k i,t-1 <0.07), for each of three sub-periods: 1995-2000 (before the introduction of PCA); (from the introduction of PCA to the financial crisis); and (in the aftermath of the financial crisis).
The specification of the empirical model is as follows.
Survivorship equation:
Capital-adjustment equation: Survivorship depends on assets size (s), capitalization (k), liquidity (q), non-performing loans ratio (n), loans-to-assets ratio (x), non-interest expenses-to-assets ratio (e) and age (a). The change in capitalization (k) depends on growth in loans (c), change in the non-performing loans ratio (n), change in the ratio of non-interest expenses-to-assets (e) and growth in gross state product (g). 13 Table 1 lists the variable definitions in full.
Conditional on k i,t-1 having been observed, k i,t is observed with probability Mills ratio variable for inclusion in the fixed-effects regression from these probit regressions. 14 A positive coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio in the augmented capital-adjustment equation is consistent with the hypothesis that a random event or unobservable that has a positive effect on capitalization also tends to have a positive effect on the probability of survival. We estimate a single pooled probit regression for survival with a full set of time dummies, and covariates that are important in driving survival or disappearance in previous studies.
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In dynamic panels with small T, fixed-effects estimation is biased, owing to the presence among the covariates of the lagged dependent variable. In such cases, a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator is usually recommended (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) . The bias in the fixed-effects estimator diminishes as T increases, while the GMM estimator rapidly becomes unwieldy due to a proliferation of lagged values of the dependent variable and covariates that qualify for inclusion 14 In the present case, the ability of cross-sectional probit regressions to explain survival or non-survival is variable, and the estimated coefficients are unstable, owing to the relatively small proportion of disappearances (around 1.5% of the total population) in each six-monthly period (see Table 5 ). A pooled probit regression with time-period dummies allows a sufficient number of exits for reliable estimation. It seems plausible that there might well be a cyclical pattern in the rate of credit union acquisition, by far the largest exit category. The time-period dummies in the probit regression are highly significant. 12 as instruments. 16 In the present case, the availability of more than 30 observations on each surviving credit union renders the bias in the fixed-effects estimator sufficiently small to be ignored. 17 Accordingly, we estimate the capital-adjustment equation using fixed effects. The use of lagged values of all covariates partially mitigates the endogeneity problem that might arise through simultaneity between the contemporaneous values of the capital-to-assets ratio and other financial ratios.
18
Lagged values are used for the covariates of the capital-adjustment equation, to avoid possible endogeneity issues. The growth in loans c i,t-m controls for the effects of an increase in lending on the capital-to-assets ratio. In addition to a natural tendency for growth in lending to place downward pressure on the capital-to-assets ratio through an increase in the assets denominator, empirical evidence suggests that periods of rapid loan growth tend to be followed by increased defaults, and consequent depletion of capital (Berger and Udell, 2004) .
The change in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans n i,t-m is a proxy for credit risk. We expect an increase in the non-performing loans ratio to be associated with a subsequent decrease in the capital-to-assets ratio, as capital is depleted by the losses arising from the eventual write-off of non-performing loans. The change in the non-interest expenses to assets ratio e i,t-1 reflects an anticipated tendency for a credit union with high operating costs to 13 encounter difficulties in maintaining adequate capitalization. Excessive operating costs deplete net income, making it difficult to increase capital in line with growth in lending. For 4,907 of the 4,947 credit unions identified as having been either acquired or subject to a purchase and assumption order, an acquiring credit union is identified by the NCUA. 20 The acquisition of another credit union is likely to affect the capital adjustment of the acquirer. For example, if the acquired credit union is undercapitalized relative to the acquirer, then some reduction in the capitalization of the acquirer is to be expected when the balance sheets of acquirer and acquired are combined. To control for this effect, synthetic first-difference and lagged values of the variables k i,t , c i,t , n i.t and e i,t for the acquirer credit union are constructed for 14 the periods immediately following the acquisition, using the combined data for the acquirer and the acquired credit unions immediately prior to the acquisition. 
Data and descriptive statistics
The balance sheet and income statement data used in the empirical analysis reported in this study are compiled from the '5300 Call Reports', published by the NCUA. Semi-annual significantly following the introduction of PCA. The non-performing loans ratio has declined gradually over time, but has seen an upturn during the current financial crisis peaking at 4.02% in 2010 before declining in both 2011 and 2012. The rate of growth in loans is sensitive to the economic cycle. There were marked reductions in the rate of loan growth in 1998 (Asian crisis), 2001-2003 (post-'dotcom' bubble) , and 2007-2012 (financial crisis and aftermath) . In this latter period annual loan growth was negative in three of the five years. Table 3 reports an analysis of the proportions of credit unions in bands defined by the capital-to-assets ratio. Of key interest is the trend in the proportion of credit unions that are classified as adequately capitalized or below, with capital-to-assets ratios below 7%. In Table 4 reports the distribution of US credit unions by assets size at each December datapoint, and the average capital-to-assets ratio in each assets size band. Throughout the observation period, there is a consistent inverse relationship between assets size and capitalization. Without exception, the average capital-to-assets ratio declined in each assets size band between 2007 and 2012.
16 Table 5 reports an analysis of entry and exits. The reduction in credit union numbers from 12,046 in 1994 to 6,814 in 2012 forms part of a longer-term decline, from a peak in numbers at 23,866 in 1969 23,866 in . Between 1994 23,866 in and 2012 exited. Most exits were as a consequence of acquisition (4,857 credit unions). The annual exit rate was smaller during the period 1995 to 1998 than it was in most subsequent years. Between 1999 and 2012 the exit rate, with the exception of 2010, has remained broadly stable (between 3% and 4% per year), and apparently insensitive to the economic cycle.
6.
Dynamic panel model for survival and capital adjustment Table 6 reports the estimation results for the probit regression for the probability of survival. 23 Coefficients significantly different from zero are obtained for all covariates. Larger credit unions are more likely to survive than smaller ones, and younger credit unions are more likely to survive than older ones. 24 Other characteristics that increase the probability of survival are: a high capital-to-assets ratio; a low liquidity ratio; a low non-performing loans ratio; a high loans-to-assets ratio; and a low ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets. 25 Table 7 reports the estimation results for the fixed-effects capital-adjustment equation, in which the dependent variable is the change in the capital-to-assets ratio over each six-month period.
Dynamics of capital adjustment
The first column of Table 7 reports a pooled estimation using the data for all credit unions. The coefficients on 1995-2000, 2000-08 and 2009-12) , and j=2,4 and 6 (adequately capitalized and 26 For convenience, we refer below to the three sub-periods as 1995-2000, 2000-08 and 2009-12. below compared across the same three sub-periods), are reported at the foot of Table 7 . The null hypothesis is rejected in every case, indicating that the differences between the estimated coefficients are statistically significant.
The interpretation of the coefficients reported in Table 7 may be simplified by transforming the estimated coefficients to recover the implied coefficients on k i,t-1 , k i,t-2 and k i, t-3 in the equivalent levels autoregression for k i,t . With reference to [2] , the coefficients on  are larger, in the early stages recovery is relatively fast, but full recovery takes longer.
For well capitalized credit unions (k i,t-1 0.07), the adjustment to a negative capitalization shock is similar in all three sub-periods. For credit unions that were adequately capitalized or below, (k i,t-1 <0.07), the adjustment (rate of mean reversion) was faster for the sub-periods 1995-2000 and 2000-08 than for the sub-period 2009-12. 27 According to the estimations for the subperiods 1995-2000 and 2000-08 , if a credit union that is initially adequately capitalized or below experiences a negative capitalization shock, the adjustment is faster than in the case of a similar shock to a credit union that is initially well capitalized. By contrast, for the 2009-12 sub-period the adjustment is slower for a credit union that is initially adequately capitalized or below than it is for one that is well capitalized.
For credit unions that were initially well capitalized, neither the introduction of PCA, nor the financial crisis, appears to have made much difference to the capital-adjustment process. For credit unions that were initially adequately capitalized and below, there was little change in the speed of adjustment following the introduction of PCA. There was, however, a marked reduction in the speed of adjustment in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The estimates for the sub-27 The differences between these estimated rates of mean reversion are statistically significant in all cases. A z-test of the hypothesis 
, interpreted as the condition that the rates of mean reversion for well capitalized credit unions are the same for all three sub-periods, yields F=33.7 (p=.000). Despite these three coefficients being qualitatively similar the test is highly significant, presumably owing to the large number of observations for well capitalized credit unions. The test of The estimations reported by Shrieves and Dahl (1992, p452 , Table III ) imply a corresponding rate of mean reversion measure of 0.942 for US banks with capitalization above the mid-1980s regulatory threshold (7% equity capital-to-assets ratio), and 0.729 for banks below this threshold. Accordingly, the rate of mean reversion is slower for the former category, and faster for the latter. The corresponding estimates for the Tier 1 leverage ratio reported by Aggarwal and Jacques (2001, p1151, 
Other influences on capital adjustment
In the estimation reported in the first column of Table 7 using the data for all credit unions, the coefficient on
, a positive and significant coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio, generated from the probit regression (Table 6 ), indicates that common unobservables impact on both the capital-to-assets ratio and the survival probability. Accordingly, the inclusion 29 For j=1, the estimated rates of mean reversion are 0.8702 (estimation without the sample-selection correction) and 0.8735 (estimation with the correction). For j=2, the corresponding estimated rates of mean reversion are 0.6860 (without) and 0.7041 (with); for j=3, 0.8627 (without) and 0.8643 (with); for j=4, 0.6995 (without) and 0.7045 (with); for j=5, 0.8708 (without) and 0.8717 (with); and for j=6, 0.9403 (without) and 0.9462 (with). Although the exclusion of the sample-selection correction does not seem to carry any serious qualitative implications for the estimation of the capital-adjustment equation, these results suggest that exclusion introduces a modest downward bias into the estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable in the capitalization regression. The sampleselection correction attributes some of the variation in capitalization to a survivorship effect. Exclusion of this correction therefore increases the unexplained proportion of the variation in capitalization, making the latter appear more random, and making capitalization appear less highly autocorrelated. For j=1 (well capitalized, 1995-2000) , a coefficient on k i,t-1 in Table 7 of -.2999 is replaced by coefficients of -.4337 for k i,t-1 0 and -.1466 for k i,t-1 <0. The larger absolute magnitude of the coefficient for k i,t-1 0 indicates that the negative persistence effect is stronger for positive changes in capitalization than it is for negative changes. For j=3 (well capitalized, [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , a coefficient on k i,t-1 in Table 7 of -.0478 is replaced by coefficients of -.2199 for k i,t-1 0 and .0697 for k i,t-1 <0. For j=5 (well capitalized, 2009-2012 ), a coefficient on k i,t-1 in Table 7 of .0347 is replaced by coefficients of -.0279 for k i,t-1 0 and .0533 for k i,t-1 <0.
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In the estimation using the data for all credit unions, negative coefficients on c i,t-m reflect a tendency for an increase in lending to place downward pressure on the capital-to-assets ratio, through an increase in the assets denominator. Negative coefficients on n i,t-m imply that an increase in the non-performing loans ratio is associated with a subsequent decrease in the capital-to-assets ratio, as capital is destroyed by the losses arising from the eventual write-offs.
Negative coefficients on e i,t-m support the hypothesis that a credit union that has difficulty in containing its operating costs may encounter difficulties in maintaining adequate capitalization.
The coefficient on g i,t-1 is large and positive, and the coefficient on g i,t-2 is small and negative. Unlike banks, credit unions do not have the option of raising new capital in the form of equity. Credit unions might therefore be expected to adopt a more cautious approach than banks to the management of their capital over the course of the economic cycle. This might explain the observed empirical tendency for capital-to-assets ratios to vary pro-cyclically. Our results concur with recent evidence that credit unions face relatively low exposure to business-cycle fluctuations, and are relatively robust to macroeconomic shocks (Smith and Woodbury, 2010) . (not reported in Table 7 ), reflect a deterioration in the capitalization of the credit union industry as a whole that is also apparent in the descriptive statistics reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 31 One-tail z-tests of null hypotheses of zero restrictions on the sums of the coefficients on the lagged differences of c, n, e and g produce the following results: test β 11 +β 12 =0 (sum of coefficients on c i,t-1 and c i,t-2 = 0), z=-7.56, p=0.000; test β 21 +β 22 =0 (sum of coefficients on n ,t-1 and n i,t-2 = 0), z=-14.9, p=0.000; test β 31 +β 32 =0 (sum of coefficients on e i,t-1 and e i,t-2 = 0), z=-8.57, p=0.000; test β 41 +β 42 =0 (sum of coefficients on g i,t-1 and g i,t-2 = 0), z=7.56, p=0.000. These results indicate that permanent changes in the rates of growth of loans, non-performing loans ratio, or ratio of non-interest expenses to assets would produce a reduction in the equilbrium capital-to-assets ratio; and a permanent change in the rate of growth of gross state product would produce an increase in the equilbrium capital-to-assets ratio.
6.3
Capital adjustment for credit unions by 1994 assets size band, and post-1994 entrants The remaining columns of Table 7 report estimations for credit unions in each of five assets size bands defined using 1994 data, and for a (smaller) sixth group comprising subsequent entrants. Survival rates are highly dependent on assets size: only 25.4% of the credit unions in the smallest 1994 assets size band survived until 2012, while 83.6% of the credit unions in the largest 1994 assets size band survived.
For credit unions classified as well capitalized (k i,t-1 0.07), the coefficients on suggest that the rate of mean reversion in capital adjustment is faster for credit unions in the smallest and largest assets size bands, and slower for credit unions of intermediate size. For credit unions that are adequately capitalized or below (k i,t-1 <0.07), there is more variation in these coefficients, presumably due to sampling error with relatively few observations in some cells. The rate of mean reversion for this group, both before and after the introduction of PCA, is fastest in the smallest assets size band.
We conjecture that the pattern for well capitalized credit unions might reflect a u-shaped relationship between the proportion of loans in a credit union's assets portfolio, and its capital adjustment speed. In 2012, the average loans-to-assets ratios of credit unions classified by percentiles of the assets size distribution were as follows: 0.425 (below p10, the 10 th percentile of the assets size distribution), 0.479 (p10-p25), 0.465 (p25-p50), 0.504 (p50-p75), 0.565 (p75-p90), and 0.594 (above p90). Over most of the assets size distribution, a credit union with a higher loans-to-assets ratio, and therefore a relatively low proportion of investments in its assets portfolio, is likely to adjust more slowly to an adverse capitalization shock, because it has lesser 25 capacity to adjust its balance sheet quickly by buying or selling investments. At the upper end of the size distribution, however, this pattern is not maintained: the largest credit unions are able to achieve enhanced flexibility in managing their loans portfolios through engagement with secondary loan markets: for example, buying and selling shares in syndicated loans, or trading real estate mortgage loans in secondary markets.
In the estimations for credit unions in each of the five 1994 assets size bands, the coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio are positive and significant for all but the smallest size band. In general, the importance of the sample-selection effect increases with assets size. 32 The coefficients on c i,t-m are negative and predominantly significant. The coefficients on n i,t-m are predominantly negative, and significant in the estimations for the larger assets size bands. All coefficients on e i,t-1 and several of the coefficients on e i,t-2 are negative and significant. The coefficients on g i,t-1 are positive and significant, indicating that the capitalization of credit unions in all asset size bands is pro-cyclical. The coefficients on g i,t-2 are negative and significant for the larger size bands, and insignificant for the smaller size bands. Large variations in the magnitudes of several of the estimated coefficients for the post-1994 entrants should be interpreted with caution in view of the small number of observations for this estimation.
Conclusion
This study examines the capital-adjustment process for US credit unions before and after the implementation of capital requirements and PCA in 2000. Given that the credit unions 32 These results suggest that the link between survivorship and capitalization is stronger for large than for small credit unions. Our conjecture is that the survival or disappearance of large credit unions is likely to be driven primarily by their capitalization. For smaller credit unions, by contrast, other factors may be paramount: for example, a small credit union might be acquired and absorbed into another credit union if its common bond becomes obsolete owing to the closure of the employer of its members, or because its present management wishes to retire.
decreased by over one-third during the 1994-2012 observation period, the capital-adjustment model estimated includes a control for survivorship bias (derived from a probit regression for the probabilities of survival or disappearance for each credit union in each six-month time period).
The model also allows for different capital-adjustment speeds for well and adequately capitalized credit unions both before and after the implementation of PCA and in the aftermath of the financial crisis of the late-2000s.
According to the probit regression, larger credit unions are more likely to survive than smaller ones, and younger credit unions are more likely to survive than older ones. Other characteristics that increase the probability of survival include a high capital-to-assets ratio, a low liquid assets-to-assets ratio, a low non-performing loans ratio, a high loans-to-assets ratio, and a low ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets.
In the estimated capital-adjustment regression, credit union capitalization is meanreverting around a long-run average value that has varied over time. The introduction of the PCA regulatory regime appears to have achieved a sustained reduction in the proportion of credit unions operating with capitalization below 7%. PCA appears to have exerted a deterrent effect, such that credit unions became less likely to reach a state requiring regulatory intervention.
However, PCA seems to have made little or no difference to the pattern of adjustment following an adverse capitalization shock. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there was little change to the pattern of capital adjustment for credit unions classified as well capitalized; but for credit unions in the adequately capitalized and below category, the speed of recovery following an adverse capitalization shock was sharply reduced.
Credit union capitalization is found to vary pro-cyclically. This suggests that credit unions may manage their capital cautiously over the business cycle, in the absence of an option 27 to raise new capital in the form of equity. By accumulating capital when it is easiest to do so during an economic upturn, there is more scope for capital to be depleted through write-offs during a subsequent downturn. This (along with constraints on asset and funding diversification) may explain why credit unions generally weathered the financial crisis of the late-2000s better than many commercial banks.
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that credit unions have for the most part been strongly capitalized, and have maintained capital above the threshold required by the PCA framework instituted in 2000. Nevertheless, the recent financial crisis has placed severe downward pressure on capitalization, leading to an increase in the number of credit unions triggering supervisory actions by the regulator in order to restore net worth. The ongoing legislative agenda in US Congress is likely to lead to regulatory change which will provide a new risk-based capital regime alongside existing leverage arrangements. This is likely to provide credit unions with more flexibility in the forms of capital held, and increase their ability to meet regulatory minima when changes in economic conditions (and resultant shocks to balance sheets) occur. Table 2 Descriptive statistics
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